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Abstract
Users may have multiple profiles when writing comments, blogs, and tweets on the web.
While some of these profiles reveal true identity, the others are created under pseudonyms.
This is essential especially in the countries with oppressive governments where activists are
writing pseudonymous tweets or Facebook messages. In these countries, government officials
discovering the fact that a person is among the activists may have serious consequences, the
activist being imprisoned, or even his or her life being jeopardized. Pseudonyms may provide
a sense of anonymity, however the writing patterns of an author can provide clues that can
be used to link the pseudonymous account to the public account. More specifically, one can
look at some features within the text whose author is known, and build a model by using
these features to predict whether a given (supposedly) anonymous text belongs to that author
or not. In this work, we first demonstrate that a person can be identified as being part of a
group by using his/her tweets. We used twitter since it is a popular platform, but the problem
is not specific to twitter. We show that through tweets, an adversary can build a classifier from
public tweets of known users to match them with pseudonymous twitter accounts. We use
a simple vector-space model with tf-idf weights to represent documents and a Naive-Bayes
classifer with cosine similarity measure. We show that the problem of matching public and
pseudonymous accounts exists in twitter through experiments with real data. We also provide
a formalism to describe the problem and based on the formalism we provide a solution to
protect the privacy of individuals who would like to stay anonymous when writing tweets.
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TWITTER’DAKI˙ ANONI˙M HESAPLARIN ORTAYA
C¸IKARTILMASI
I˙nanc¸ Arın
Bilgisayar Bilimleri ve Mu¨hendislig˘i, Yu¨kseklisans Tezi, 2012
Tez Danıs¸manı: Yu¨cel Saygın
O¨zet
Kullanıcılar internet ag˘ı u¨zerinden yorum, blog ve tweet yazarken birden fazla profile
sahip olabilirler. Bu kullanıcıların bir kısmı gerc¸ek kimliklerini ortaya c¸ıkarırken, dig˘er kısmı
profillerini anonim olarak takma isimle olus¸tururlar. Bu durum o¨zellikle eylemcilerin tweet
ya da Facebook mesajlarını anonim olarak yazdıg˘ı baskıcı hu¨ku¨metlerin bulundug˘u u¨lkel-
erde c¸ok gereklidir. Bu u¨lkelerde, eylemcilerin arasında bulunan kis¸ilerin ciddi sorunlarla
kars¸ılas¸abileceg˘i, hapis cezasına c¸arptırılabilecekleri ve hatta hayatlarının riske atılmıs¸ ola-
bileceg˘i gerc¸eg˘i hu¨ku¨met yetkilileri tarafından ortaya konulmus¸tur. Her ne kadar takma isimli
bir hesaba sahip olmak belli olaranda gizlilik sag˘lasa da yazarların yazım s¸ablonu, anonim
hesapları ve gerc¸ek hesapları ilis¸kilendirmek ic¸in ipuc¸ları verebilir. Daha belirgin olarak, biri-
leri yazarı bilinen bir yazının o¨zelliklerine bakarak bu o¨zelliklerden bir model olus¸turabilir ve
bu olus¸turdug˘u modeli verilen bas¸ka bir anonim yazının bu yazara ait olup olmadıg˘ını tahmin
etmek ic¸in kullanabilir. Bu c¸alıs¸mada ilk olarak, verilen bir kis¸inin tweetlerine bakarak bu
kis¸inin belirli bir grubun parc¸ası olarak tanımlanabileceg˘ini kanıtlayacag˘ız. Biz bu c¸alıs¸ma
ic¸in c¸ok popu¨ler bir platform olan Twitterı kullanmıs¸ olsak da bu problemin sadece Twitter ile
kısıtlı olmadıg˘ını belirtmek isteriz. Go¨sterdig˘imiz dig˘er bir nokta, bir aleyhtar gerc¸ek isimli
kullanıcıların tweetlerini kullanarak, bu gerc¸ek hesapları anonim hesaplarla es¸les¸tirebilmek
v
ic¸in bir sınıflandırıcı yaratabilir. Biz bu c¸alıs¸mada Naive-Bayes sınıflandırıcı, kosinu¨s ben-
zerlig˘i o¨lc¸u¨su¨ ve do¨ku¨manları temsil eden kelimelerin tf-idf ag˘ırlıklarından olus¸an bir vek-
tor uzayı kullanmaktayız. Ayrıca problemimizi tanımlayan bir formalizm olus¸turarak, tweet
yazarken anonim kalmaya davam etmek isteyen bireyler ic¸in olus¸turdug˘umuz formalizm
u¨zerinden gizlilig˘i korumaya yo¨nelik bazı c¸o¨zu¨mler de ortaya koymaktayız.
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1 Introduction
Privacy preserving data management has been an active research area for the past few decades.
One of the main problems of privacy preserving data management is to prevent linkage at-
tacks on data to be published. Although privacy preserving data publishing has been studied
a lot, there are still privacy leaks due to release of different and more complex data sets.
For example in August 4, 2006, American Online (AOL) published a data set containing the
search logs of about 650.000 users over a 3 months period [2]. Actually, this data set has been
published so that researchers can experiment with data mining techniques for search query
optimization and other similar purposes. AOL de-identified the data by deleting the direct
identifiers and the IP addresses, however, there was still a scandalous privacy leak that made
it to the New York Times damaging the reputation of AOL. The privacy leak was demon-
strated by a curious journalist to identify a user just by combining the search keywords of
that user with some background knowledge. An AOL user with pseudonym 4417749 (Thelma
Arnold) was identified by her searches. The search keywords of Thelma Arnold gave hints on
the place she lives and her relatives since she was searching people with surname Arnold [5]
together with her interests. Although AOL had removed the data by accepting that sharing
this data was a mistake [17], the data can still be downloaded from some internet mirrors.
Many search engines such as Google, and Bing keep logs of our queries in their databases.
Due to privacy concerns, Google has announced that they anonymize their query logs after a
period of time, but anonymization of web logs is still an open research question. For example
authors in [18] show that combinations of small pieces of search logs can be efficiently used
for identification of individuals like in the AOL case.
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In general, a user’s activities on the web can actually be used to distinguish that user
from others. Social interactions, visited web sites, communications etc can be defined as
user activity. Generally all of these activities come into consideration where each of them
may construct a path to make a model of individuals. For example in [29] authors show that
syntactic information can be used to identify the author of a given text. In experiments, it is
proven that length of sentences and paragraphs, number of words in a sentence or paragraph,
paragraph style like indentation style and the spacing between paragraphs can be used as key
points to distinguish each user. Available text written by web users has been increasing espe-
cially with the usage of social networks. Consequently social networks become an important
area for researchers to work. By using social media, users tend to correspond with each other
and share their comments and ideas. Newsgroups, and blogs have been popular platforms
where users write about themselves or comment about popular issues. With social media this
phenomena has become more widespread and even changed the way the information is col-
lected and disseminated. People use social media not only for their daily social life but also
for some critical social or political events. In recent years, people have been started to get
together on social platforms to show their reactions, to become organized and to exchange
and share information between each other. We have seen that social media has played an
important role in the Arab Spring where Facebook and Twitter have been used by the ac-
tivist to inform the world about what has been happening and to organize protest meetings.
In social media, people may have multiple profiles due to various reasons. While some of
these profiles public, revealing the actual identity, the others are created under pseudonyms
to write freely and anonymously. In the countries with oppressive governments it is vital for
the activists to stay anonymous when writing tweets or Facebook messages.
Pseudonyms in social media provide a sense of anonymity. However, writing patterns of
people may provide clues that can be used to match a pseudonym with a public account. A
sophisticated attacker may use data mining techniques to build a model to predict the author
of (supposedly) anonymous text. We claim that it is possible to identify a pseudonym with
large certainty by using repeating misspelling and the frequently used words. In this work, in
order to demonstrate our claims, we focus on twitter and show that through tweets, one can
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extract some features that can distinguish a user from the others. These features could be the
writing mistakes, or specific words used that are topic independent. We treat the collection of
the tweets by the same user as a document and represent these documents with vector-space
model with tf-idf weights and use cosine similarity to identify users.
Doubtless, people make some errors while they performing such actions on the online
environment. As it is stated in [16], during their activities, users may fill wrong forms or they
may type wrong URL. People usually experience various number of problems during their
internet activity and they are forced to make some errors with a good or bad grace. Here,
we also focus on a specific type of error which is their spelling errors. Millions of people
share their ideas and emotions via social network like Twitter, Facebook everyday. While
they are sharing such emotions and ideas, they type lines of text consistently with their spell
errors. We can make an model of each user by detecting specific spell error types with their
statistical information and we claim that it is possible to identify owner of a text by using this
model. When we have a model of a public account, then a pseudonym tweet (or some other
text) can be matched with public accounts through a classifier.
Since it is not possible to find a data set with public and pseudonymous accounts, we
simulate this scenario by separating the tweets of a user into two disjoint sets, and do this for
all the users. One set of tweets becomes public account of a user and the other one becomes
its pseudonym. Then, we try to re-match a given pseudonym with its true public account
by considering the features we mentioned above. Our experiments showed that around 90%
of the case, we can re-join the disjoint sets with the matching account. This shows that the
problem of matching public and pseudonymous accounts exists in twitter which is the main
contribution of this work.
3
2 Preliminaries and Background
In this section, we formally introduce some preliminary notation which will be used to solve
the problem. Firstly, we will introduce misspelling operations as we will use them for de-
tecting error types in a misspelled word. Minimum Edit Distance algorithm will be provided
for finding distance between strings. Then, text categorization and classification techniques
will be mentioned to explain constructing learning models and application of them. Doc-
ument indexing process is needed for converting text documents into representable formats
and Cosine similarity will be used to calculate similarity between documents.
2.1 Misspelling Operations
Misspelling operations are defined in [41] as processes that can be applied to any kind of text
and can provide a path between word and misspelled word. When we consider the nature of
misspellings, we can divide them into three different categories:
1. Insertion: misspelled string has one more character that correct string does not have.
2. Omission: misspelled string has an absent character that correct string has.
3. Substitution: one character is replaced by a different one in the correct string.
It can be useful to give examples to these error types. When a user types ther instead
of the, it is an insertion error. If a user types th instead of the, then we evaluate this error
type as deletion. Lastly, if a user types thw instead of the, then this error is cagetorized as
substitution.
Misspelling operations can be used to identify individuals with collecting all misspell
errors of each user and constructing a learning model through this information. Misspell
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errors play an important role in our word, therefore this topic will be discussed in later section
in more detail.
2.2 Minimum Edit Distance Techniques
As we said before, misspelling operations are crucial for our claim; however apart from this,
we also need to find minimum edit distance between a misspelled word and a correct ver-
sion of this word. In this point, we need to mention about minimum edit distance concept as
Kukich defines Minimum Edit Distance in [20] as the minimum number of misspelling oper-
ation 2.1 (insertion, omission, and substitution) to convert from one string to another. Firstly,
the minimum edit distance algorithms were implemented by Damerau and Levenshtein; how-
ever, in this paper the algorithm which is implemented by Levenshtein, as the most common
distance algorithm, is used as Minimum Edit Distance Technique. Baake defines Levenshtein
distance in [3] as a special technique which plays an important role for comparison of sym-
bolic sequences in many well known areas like linguistic, genome research etc. Pseudocode
for Levenshtein Distance, which is taken from [7], can be found in the algorithm 1.
The space and time complexity of the algorithm is O(nm). However space complexity can
be improved since we only need for previous row and columns instead of keeping all of them.
Here, there is an example for finding Levenshtein Distance (LD) between two strings. In
the table 1, we apply the Levenshtein algorithm to find the edit distance between sitting and
kitten. Firstly, we put default values for d[i, 0] = i where i is 1→ m and for d[0, j] = j where
j is 1→ n. Then, in the main loop, for each index of the matrix, we check whether characters
of two strings are same. As it is stated in the algorithm, if these characters are same, then
we determine the current index d[i, j] exactly same as d[i − 1, j − 1]. Otherwise, we attribute
current value to minimum(d[i − 1, j] + 1, d[i, j − 1] + 1, d[i − 1, j − 1] + 1). When we look
at the different character indexes in the table, we determine d[1, 1] = 1 since the minimum
value is d[0, 0] which means it is a substitution between s and k. Then, we find a difference in
d[5, 5] such that the minimum value holds in index d[4, 4] which again means a substitution
between e and i. Lastly, the final difference occurs in d[7, 6] such that the minimum value
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Algorithm 1 Levenshtein Distance Algorithm (char s[1..m], char t[1..n])
1: declare int d[0..m, 0..n]
2: set each element of d to zero
3: // for all i and j, d[i, j] will hold the Levenshtein distance between
4: // the first i characters of s and the first j characters of t
5: for i = 1→ m do
6: d[i, 0]← i
7: end for
8: for j = 1→ n do
9: d[0, j]← j
10: end for
11: for j = 1→ n do
12: for i = 1→ m do
13: if s[i] = t[ j] then
14: d[i, j]← d[i − 1, j − 1]
15: else
16: d[i, j]← minimum(d[i − 1, j] + 1, d[i, j − 1] + 1, d[i − 1, j − 1] + 1)
17: // d[i − 1, j] + 1 means a omission
18: // d[i, j − 1] + 1 means an insertion
19: // d[i − 1, j − 1] + 1 means a substitution
20: end if
21: end for
22: end for
23: return d[m, n]
is d[6, 6] meaning that there is an insertion of g in the current point. Consequently, as it is
explained, the LD(sitting, kitten) = 3 since there should be one substitution(s,k), one other
substitution(i,e) and one insertion(g) which means 3 transactions are needed to convert kitten
to sitting.
In this work, we use Minimum Edit Distance Technique (Levenshtein Distance) since it
provides some additional information about misspelled words of a user. As it is said before,
we determine what kind of misspelling error(s) are done by user with their detailed infor-
mation and we also calculate the edit distance between the misspelled word and the correct
word. This distance information can also be used for a modeling operation of a specific user.
In this point, we need to consider following question: When a user makes a mistake when
typing, how can we find out the correct word that user implies. In other words, we need to
understand the real word to obtain edit distance and misspelled error types (insertion, omis-
6
k i t t e n
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
s 1 1 2 3 4 5 6
i 2 2 1 2 3 4 5
t 3 3 2 1 2 3 4
t 4 4 3 2 1 2 3
i 5 5 4 3 2 2 3
n 6 6 5 4 3 4 2
g 7 7 6 5 4 4 3
Table 1: An example to find edit distance between two words
sion, substitution). For this purpose, we firstly check whether a word is typed correctly by
searching this word in the spell checker of Google. If it exists in the dictionary, it means
that this word was written correctly; otherwise it means, willingly or unwillingly, user made
a mistake when typing the specified word. If we understand that the word is a misspelled
word, then Google provides some suggestions for the implied (correct) word. At this junc-
ture, we assume that the first suggestion, which is provided by Google, is the real implied
word by user. Then, we take this word and start to find our spell error types. More detailed
information will be explained in section 4.1.
2.3 Text Categorization
Text Categorization (or Text Classification) can be evaluated as the activity of labeling of
natural language texts as some predefined categories. More formally, it can be defined as
the process of assigning a boolean value to each pair of (d j, ci) ∈ D × C where D is set of
documents and C is set of predefined categories C = {c1, c2, . . . , cn}. If (d j, ci) is true, it means
that document d j can be categorized under category ci. Otherwise, the situation that false is
assigned to the a pair (d j, ci) indicates that the document d j does not belong to the category ci.
All these information is indicated in [34] as the following crucial points are also referenced
in the same paper. In the concept of Machine Learning area, classification problem can be
defined as a supervised learning problem because the execution part is mainly composed of
learning process by using the knowledge of category information of training set for the pre-
diction of test set. In this point, definitions of training and test sets are given below as they
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were defined in [34].
• a training (or validation) set TV = {d1, d2, . . . , d|TV |}. This is the set of documents
observing the characteristics of which the classifiers for the various categories are in-
ductively built;
• a test set Te = {d|T |+1, . . . , d|Ω|} where Ω = {d1, . . . , d|Ω|} is initial corpus that documents
previously classified under the same set of categories. Test set will be used for the
purpose of testing the effectiveness of the classifiers.
2.4 Document Indexing
One other important point, which emphasized by authors in [34], is document indexing pro-
cess. Document indexing is crucial for machine learning or data mining tasks since a classifier
or a classifier building algorithm cannot directly process a text. For this reason, we need an
indexing technique such that it maps a text d j into a representable format for classifiers to
make this text d j eligible for being interpreted by classifiers and algorithms. Needless to say,
documents in both training and testing set should be converted into representable format by
an indexing procedure for the certain reason. In this concept, a text document d j is repre-
sented as a vector of weights d j = < w1 j,w2 j, . . . ,w|T | j > where T is set of terms or features
and 0 ≤ wk j ≤ 1 which indicates how much term tk plays an important role semantically in
document d j.
One other technique for indexing procedure is keeping phrases rather than individual
words as indexing terms in [15, 33, 37]. However, the experimental results show that the idea
of phrases is not so encouraging.
As it is pointed before, for a term tk, the range of its weight is 0 ≤ wk j ≤ 1 (however, there
is an exception in [23]) and in some studies like [1, 19, 22, 24, 28, 27, 32, 35, 33], authors
preferred to assign a binary value to the wk j in the indexing system. For this case, wk j=1
means the presence of the term tk in the document d j and wk j=0 means the absence of the
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term tk in the document d j.
In the case of non-binary indexing technique, which is more widely used in Information
Retrieval applications, generally tfidf weighting function is used to create vector of weights
for each document as it is stated in [30]. The tfidf weight (term frequencyinverse document
frequency) is a statistic information which reflects how important a word is to a document in
a set of collection of documents. The formula of tfidf is given below:
t f id f (tk, d j) = #(tk, d j) · log |Tr|#Tr(tk)
where #(tk, d j) is the number of occurrences of tk in d j, |Tr| is the size of the document corpus,
#Tr(tk) is the number of documents in Tr that tk appears in. When we analyze characteristics
of the formula, if a term tk occurs frequently in some specific document d j, this increases
the importance of tk in d j, however if tk also occurs in many documents in the corpus, then
importance of tk for the document d j decreases according to the tfidf formula.
Additionally, these tfidf weights should be normalized by using cosine normalization
technique to make them fall in [0, 1] interval as normalization way is given in [34]:
wk j =
t f id f (tk, d j)√∑|T |
s=1(t f id f (ts, d j))
2
2.5 Dimensionality Reduction
One other important point that we need to discuss about Text Categorization is that dimen-
sionality reduction. When we consider the term space for the classification algorithms, high
number of term spaces may be problematic like in the LLSF algorithm in [39]. For that rea-
son, usually a reduction in the term vector is needed for the process that reducing |T | to |T ′|
where |T ′| < |T | and T ′ is named as reduced term set as in [34]. For the Term Space Reduc-
tion (TSR) problem, one of the well know algorithm, document frequency algorithm, is again
stated in [34]. The document frequency algorithm #Tr(tk) keeps only the terms which occurs
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highest number of documents with considering the idea that the terms occur frequently in
the document corpus are the most valuable terms. It seems like there is a contradiction in
this point such that we previously said the terms occur in less documents (in other words the
terms which have low to medium frequency [31]) are more informative. However, these two
thesis do not contradict each other since there are enormous number of very low frequency
words in a large term corpus and when we reduce vector space, only low frequency words are
removed from corpus. The informative words which are low to medium frequency still exist
in the term corpus. In [40], authors experimentally show that they could manage the reduce
vector space by factor of 100 without any loss in effectiveness. Last but not least, before start-
ing the dimensionality reduction process, stop words should be removed from documents to
only deal with neutral words as Mladenic has pointed in [26].
2.6 Naive Bayes Classification Model
Naive Bayes algorithm is mainly based on conditional probability. The brief logic behind this
model is well known Bayesian formula which takes into consideration frequency and combi-
nations of values in historical data. Naive Bayes aims to calculate the means and variances
of the parameters by using training data in a supervised learning way to make a classification
model. For this process, Maximum Likelihood method is used as one of the well known
methods for parameter estimation.
In our work, one of the preferred classification algorithm is Naive Bayes because of its
performance and optimality. The reasons behind its good accuracy are explained in [42], as
they show the distribution of dependencies by indicating the distribution of local dependen-
cies of each class and showing how these dependencies work together in some manner.
As Naive Bayes is a probabilistic classifier, it tries to calculate P(ci|~d j) which means that
a given document donated by a vector of weigths ~d j =
{
w1 j, . . . ,w|T | j
}
, what is the probability
that this document ~d j belongs to the category ci, as discussed in [21, 34]. The related formula
for Naive is given below:
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P(ci|~d j) = P(ci)P(
~d j|ci)
P(~d j)
where P(~d j) is the probability that a randomly chosen document has weights of vector repre-
sentation as ~d j, P(ci) means probability that a randomly chosen document belongs to category
ci. To explain P(~d j|ci), we need to make an assumption such that the words in the document
are neither dependent on their position nor the length of the document.
P(~d j|ci) =
|T |∏
k=1
P(wk j|ci)
Classification methods contain some main steps for the process. These steps are defined in
[6] as the figure 1.
Figure 1: Steps of a classification process
By definition, we need a labeled training data for learning algorithm. Then, this algorithm
calculates the mean and variance values for each attribute in the dataset; this information
becomes as a learned classifier (it can be also called as learned model). Lastly, when a
unlearned data comes into question for classification, process ends with a class prediction
according to the learned classifier which we prepared before.
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2.7 Cross-Validation
Cross-validation is a well-known technique for the performance evaluation of a classifier. In
this technique, data is split into equal sized partitions, and each partition is used same number
of times for training process and once for the testing process. As it is explained in detail in
[36], assume we split our data into two equal-sized partitions. Firstly, we select one of the
partitions as our training data and use other partition as testing data. Then, we change the
roles and the second partition becomes a training data while the other one becomes testing
data. This technique is named as two-fold cross-validation in the literature. To generalize
this approach as in [36], we define k-fold cross-validation technique as segmenting the data
into k equal-sized partitions. While all process is being executed, one partition is selected for
testing and the remaining partitions run as training data. This process is applied k times since
each of the partitions should become a test data exactly for once. Consequently, all iterations
are considered for the final result to evaluate the performance of the classifier.
2.8 Cosine Similarity
We use Cosine similarity technique to calculate the similarity function that we describe
above. Cosine similarity is a similarity technique such that it measures the cosine angle be-
tween two documents d1 and d2 which are represented by vectors. The maximum value of
cosine is 1 (cosine of 0) and the minimum value is -1 that if two vectors are exactly same
then their similarity measure is 1.
The main formula for cosine similarity is derived from well known Euclidean dot product
formula as given in [36]:
A • B = ||A|| ||B|| cos(θ)
where • donates vector dot product and ||d|| denotes the length of vector d. Thus, we can
rewrite the formula to obtain cosine value between two vectors:
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cos(d1, d2) = cos(θ) =
A • B
||A|| ||B|| =
∑n
i=1 Ai × Bi√∑n
i=1(Ai)2 ×
√∑n
i=1(Bi)2
Note that although the range of the cosine of an angle is [-1, 1], the practical range of
cosine similarity is [0, 1] in text matching case. The reason behind that both vectors A and B
represents t f id f weights which cannot be less than 0.
2.9 K-anonymity
In this part, we will define k-anonymity algorithm for privacy preserving issues. However,
before we give the definition of k-anonymity, we need to mention about some concepts which
compose the basis of k-anonymity algorithm.
Definition 2.9.1 Quasi-identifiers (generally abbreviated as QI) are the set of attributes which
are not sensitive, however may cause identification of users by using some other resources as
defined in [8]. Address, age, sex attributes can be given as examples of quasi-identifiers.
Definition 2.9.2 An equivalence class contains set of rows from data where these rows are
not distinguishable between each other through a set of attributes (referred in [8]).
In the light of this information, as defined in [8, 9], we say that a table T is k-anonymous
if and only if for each equivalence class E regarding a set of QI, |E| ≥ k. For instance, when
we look at Table [?], we see that this table is 2-anonymous since the rows in first equivalence
class (first and second rows) are indistinguishable with respect to Age, City and Sex attributes.
The other rows in second equivalence class (third and fourth rows) are also indistinguishable
between each other with respect to same attributes again.
2.10 RapidMiner
RapidMiner is an open-source data mining tool of which producers represent this tool in1
with the following two main features: it can be used as an application for data analysis and
1http://rapid-i.com/content/view/181/196/
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Age City Sex Disease
[20-30] Izmir M Cold
[20-30] Izmir M Leukaemia
[30-40] Istanbul F Broken Leg
[30-40] Istanbul F Flu
Table 2: A table with 2-anonymity
as a data mining engine for the processing its own products. RapidMiner has a world-leading
role in its area with a common usage among the people, who is working on data analysis and
data mining, under favor of its data integration, analytical tools, data analysis and reporting
opportunities and also its practical, user friendly graphical user interface and numerous other
features.
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3 Problem Definition
In this section, we are going to give a formal definition of the problem by introducing the
methods that we use to prove our claim. Given set of public accounts and another set of
pseudonym accounts, we try to determine whether it is possible to find public accounts cor-
responding to a given anonymous account with a large certainty.
3.1 Formalization of Twitter Accounts
We are going to look at a social media platform such as Twitter where we have a set of
accounts C that belong to users, where a user may have multiple accounts. Some of the ac-
counts in C have an account name that could be easily associated with a real person, or the
it is publicized that the corresponding account belongs to a real person. We denote these ac-
counts by P. Some of the accounts however are created by users who are activists to express
their opinions anonymously, and we denote them by A (for Anonymous Activists). The fact
that an individual is among the anonymous activists is private information considering that
this may have serious consequences in some countries, or the activist group may be related
to a sensitive issue such as gay marriage. We are using the example of activists in twitter,
however, the same idea applies to discussion groups on sensitive issues.
We assume that P ∪ A = C and P ∩ A = ∅. Each account ai ∈ C has an associated set of
tweets Tai = {ti1 , ti2 , ..., tik} where for each of ti j for 1 ≤ j ≤ k, ti j = (wi j1 ,wi j2 , ...,wi jm ),wi jl ∈ W
for 1 ≤ l ≤ m (m is the number of words in W), W being the universe of words that are used
by the Tweeters. Let f be a function that maps an anonymous account to its public account,
i.e., f : A → P ∪ {d} where d is the dummy account. If an anonymous account ai ∈ A does
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not have a corresponding public account, then f (ai) = d. Our claim is that the adversary (In
our case the oppressive government trying to uncover the activists) may estimate a function
f ′ : A→ P∪{d} which is very close to f , such that the probability that the two functions will
return the same result is greater than a threshold, i.e., P( f (a) = f ′(a)) > τ. Adversary has
the tweets of the anonymous and public accounts as a basis for estimating f ′ for matching a
public account with its anonymous account. In fact, we show through experiments that the
tweets can actually be used through a similarity function for matching.
In real life, the set of accounts will be evolving, with new accounts being created and
tweets being written continuously under the existing accounts. For simplicity, lets assume
that the system is frozen and the accounts in A and P are fixed together with the set of tweets
that have already been accumulated under these accounts. So there will be no insertion or
deletion of the accounts and there will be no more tweets.
Now lets assume that the adversary tries to do the matching on that snapshot of the sys-
tem. Let s be a similarity function which returns a similarity score for two accounts in terms
of the set of tweets written under those accounts. What the adversary can do is to assume that
two accounts are candidates for matching if their similarity score is greater than a threshold.
There may be a case where many accounts are above the threshold, in this case given an
anonymous account ai the adversary can rank the public accounts with respect to their simi-
larity to ai from highest to lowest, and consider the top-k most similar ones as the candidates
for matching, and those above the similarity threshold within the top-k are the candidates. So,
for a given similarity threshold σ, a positive integer k, and an anonymous account ai, among
top-k public accounts a j where s(ai, a j) > σ are the candidates for matching for an adversary.
Formally, let g(ai, σ, k) : A → Pk(P), where Pk(P) is set of all possible subsets of P with
cardinality k, is a function such that for a given account ai ∈ A, a similarity threshold σ, and a
positive integer k, it returns a set of accounts B ⊆ P, |B| ≤ k, where B = {bi ∈ P|s(ai, bi) > σ)}.
We claim that through a good similarity function P( f (a) ∈ g(a, σ, k)) > δ for even very high
similarity thresholds and show this through experimental results on real tweet data.
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3.2 Identification Methods
We looked at two different identification techniques; Errors made by users when typing and
TF-IDF based cosine similarity measures.
3.2.1 Identification Through Misspellings
We claim that misspellings are a strong identifier for the users and therefore can be used
to match an anonymous account with its public account. As we mentioned in Section 2.1,
misspelling operations are represented in [41] as processes that can be applied to any kind
of text and can provide a path between word and misspelled word. We can divide them into
three main categories:
1. Insertion: the misspelled string has a character that the correct string does not have.
For instance, user types ther instead of the.
2. Omission: the misspelled string has an absent character that the correct string has. For
instance, user types th instead of the.
3. Substitution: one character is replaced by a different one in the correct string. For
instance, user types thw instead of the.
We use all these three categories to model the misspellings in the tweets of a specific user.
As learning features we use the misspelled word, the correct word, and also to learn which
of these error types occurred together with their frequency. Additionally, we keep track of
not only misspelling error types but also specific character that leads to occurrence of this
error. In other words, we will construct a learning model -by using Naive Bayes modeling
technique - for each user to apply this model in the classification algorithm. Assume we have
d misspellings in our corpus, and assume there are d′ corresponding correct words. Then
feature vector contains (d + d′ + 4 ∗ c) elements where c is the number of different characters
used by all users. 4∗c comes from we have for different types of features which are insertion,
deletion, substitution1 and substitution2 as in Table 4. For that reason feature vector becomes
as follows:
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f eatureVector =

misspelledWord(w1)
misspelledWord(w2)
.
.
correctWord(w1)
correctWord(w2)
.
.
insertion(c1)
insertion(c2)
.
.
deletion(c1)
deletion(c2)
.
.
substitution1(c1)
substitution1(c2)
.
.
substitution2(c1)
substitution2(c2)
.
.

3.2.2 Identification Through TF-IDF Based Weighted Cosine Similarity
Identification through typos and misspellings is based on a single word and which kinds of
errors does the user do for a given word. We also considered the set of tweets of users as a bag
of words and looked at how much this set can identify the user. In order to do that, we used
the TF-IDF weighting scheme where words which are used a lot by the user but not by other
users are given a higher weight. What an adversary can do is to construct the TF-IDF vectors
(with size of |W | where W is set of all words and each index represents the tf-idf weight of
term wi) of the users in P and A in terms of their set of tweets and apply the cosine similarity
of the accounts using the TF-IDF vectors.
f eatureVector =

t f − id f (w1)
t f − id f (w2)
.
.
t f − id f (w|W |)

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3.3 Possible Solutions for Identification
In this section, we suggest some solutions according to the observations that we make during
our work. In the Section 4, we try to prove our claim with some number of experiments
while we also explain the reasons behind our claim. We recommend the solutions based on
the reasons which we also explain the cause and effect relation between these reasons and our
claim in the following parts of the thesis.
In Section3.2, we mentioned that we proposed two methods for identifications of users as
well as we will propose two possible solutions for these identification methods, one solution
for each method, to help keeping privacy of users on social web. At this point, we are in
need of clarifying a subject which underlies this thesis. Although we propose two methods
for identification, our main goal is not helping the adversaries who identify users for different
purposes. On the contrary, our aim is to experimentally show that users can be identified by
using some data mining techniques; whereas users may think that their privacy is in safe just
by changing user name or IP but the truth is different. In this sense, we suggest solutions
against two methods we proposed, so that anonymous users cannot be matched with their
public accounts with high accuracy.
Firstly, as we pointed in Section3.2.1 we can detect anonymous accounts by modeling
their spelling errors. Classifier learns each user’s misspell behavior with their characters, er-
ror types, etc. As a result of this process, classifier may notice some kind of misspelled word
or error type is a typical behavior of a specific user ai. The suggested solution is that we
may design a system such that this system may control tweets just before posting operation
of user. If the system finds a spell error which is special to the this user (or which can cause
identification of anonymous user) then it may automatically correct this misspelled word.
Our second solution is against the identification through tf-idf weight based cosine simi-
larity method. Logic behind this method is the identification of users through the words with
high tf-idf value for this user. High tf-idf value of a word w for a user u means that this word w
is used frequently by user u and other users do not use w as much as u does (see Section 2.4).
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In other words, cosine similarity technique finds similarity scores between users and it makes
use of vector representations of documents where these vectors are composed of tf-idf values
of words. Therefore, we may again develop a system that detects the suspicious words of
which tf-idf values are high for a user and can cause detection of user for this reason. The
system may warn the user to change the aforementioned word or it may automatically change
this word with its synonyms for which tf-idf value does not endanger the user.
Lastly, we need to point that we are still working on these solutions and they may be
improved after some number of experiments and observations. Performance and effectiveness
of these solutions are considered as a future work as it will be mentioned later.
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4 Experimental Evaluation
In this work, we firstly make some number of experiments to show that tweets with anony-
mous authors could be linked to other tweet accounts with known user identities via specific
features that appear in the written text. We use text classification as a tool for linking dif-
ferent user identities and consider the spelling mistakes and some other features as attributes
for classification for the evaluation of the first method which is explained in Section 3.2.1.
On the other hand, for the second technique, we used cosine similarity technique as we share
results of the experiments below.
We experimented with a Twitter data that was made available by the CAW 2.0 (Content
Analysis for WEB 2.0) workshop organized at WWW 2009 conference. The data could be
downloaded from http : //caw2.barcelonamedia.org/node/24. This data set contains about
900K posts of about 27K users. The average number of tweets per account is about 36, and
the maximum number tweets observed for a user is 223. Additionally, 5303 users have more
than 50 tweets posted in the data. There are also users with very few tweets, therefore we do
not consider those users in our experiments. The tweets were collected between the period
of October 2006 and January 2009. For all tweets posted by a user, it is possible to find a
timestamp information that indicates the exact posting time of the relevant tweet.
4.1 Experiments on the Typos and Misspellings
In this section, we define the steps of the algorithm, mentioned in Section 3.2.1, in a devel-
opment sequence. We firstly need to train that data to make model of each user. For this
purpose, for each word in each tweet, we check whether this word is typed correctly. In this
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process, as it is stated in previous sections, we use Google spell checker to understand cor-
rectness of a word. Actually, there is a Java API which calls Google’s spell checker service
from Java applications. If the word which we check is typed incorrectly, then spell checker
suggests some number of words with their ranking value and we pick the first suggested word
as default. In other words, we assume that if some written word has a spelling error then the
highest ranked word by spell checker is the real intended word by user. This process is exe-
cuted for each tweet, and it is possible to analyze which words are written incorrectly, which
misspelled words are used instead of corresponding correct words, the edit distance between
correct and misspelled word and the frequency of the occurrence of an error. Moreover, we
can also obtain specific error types with specific letter or characters for each misspelled word.
In this point, we are able to construct a Naive Bayes model for spelling error behavior of a
specific user by using these analytical information we obtain.
After we construct our model, when an unknown tweet comes into question we again
firstly detect misspelled words in this tweet, the edit distance between correct and misspelled
word, and the error types which occurred in these words, then we are ready to identify the au-
thor of this tweet by using a categorization technique with the model we constructed before.
For categorization and model construction processes, different kinds of categorization and
modeling techniques can be applied. However in our experiments we applied Naive Bayes
classification technique since it is a probabilistic classifier and it returns a probability score
for each category.
For the categorization process explained above, we use a data mining tool RapidMiner
which is mentioned in Section 2.10. A caption from the categorization process of RapidMiner
is given in Figure 2. When we look at the overall of the process, there are 5 operators which
are Read Excel, Read Excel(2), Naive Bayes, Apply Model, Write Excel (or we also use
Write Database instead of this operator). Read Excel reads the data that is to be used for
training from a specified excel file where the data is like in Table 3 or Table 4. As it will
be explained later, this data has both label and attribute information where label information
is going to be predicted by classifier. Naive Bayes operator takes the data from Read Excel
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and constructs a learning model according to the Naive Bayes algorithm. On the other hand,
Read Excel(2) operator also reads a data from another excel file(or sheet) but this data only
contains regular attributes since the label column is unknown for this data. Apply Model
operator takes two inputs, which are a learned model(mod) and an unlearned data(unl), tries
to categorize this unlearned data according to the learned model constructed by Naive Bayes
operator and outputs all predictions with their probability. Actually it gives a probability
score for every possible label, but it selects the label which has the highest probability as
the prediction. Lastly Write Excel operator transfer all outputs obtained from Apply Model
operator into another specified excel file.
Figure 2: Overall schema of categorization process in RapidMiner
For the cross-validation part, as given in figure 3, it has only two operators which are
Read Excel and X-Validation differently from the classification technique explained above. It
only requires one data (one excel file) like in Table 3 since cross-validation technique select
its own test and training data according to the k value as we explained in Section 2.7. We
select k value as 10 due to some experimental reasons. X-Validation is a nested operator
which means it has some sub-processes inside it as it is shown in Figure 4. For the training
section, we again need to use a learning operator where we select Naive Bayes operator; and
in the testing part, there are two operators which are Apply Model and Performance. Apply
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Model works in the same way as mentioned before for every iterative part of Cross Validation.
On the other hand, Performance operator calculates the PerformanceVector which contains
some accuracy information for the testing process. A basic example of PerformanceVector
output is given in Figure 5. It is possible to find the overall accuracy of the test as well as the
accuracy of each class precision.
Figure 3: Overall schema of X-Validation process in RapidMiner
Figure 4: Sub-operators inside the X-Validation operator
This section will provide the results of the experiments along with showing the necessary
steps to get better results. Initially, it is crucial to say that we have 900000 tweets to make a
model but we could not train all of the data since Google spell checker has an online limita-
tion for connections we made for checking. For that reason, we have trained a subset of our
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Figure 5: PerformanceVector
data (2000 tweets) to observe the initial results.
As the first step, we decided to take into consideration only edit distance information
between correct and incorrect words; and not considering specific error types like insertion,
deletion or substitution. In that case, when we have a look at the initial results, we observe
that only 20 percent of the authors of unknown tweets are predicted correctly which is not
good. In fact, when we think about the problem after we see the results and seek for the
reasons of low accuracy, we decided to add more detailed information as we noticed that
only keeping edit distance metric for spell errors in a tweet is not enough for a good learning
model. For instance, if some specific user writes tyrn instead of turn, we can easily detect
this word written incorrectly and we calculate Levenshtein edit distance between tyrn and
turn which is 1. Just think about another user who writes trn instead of turn. In that case,
again we are able to detect misspelled word and calculate edit distance which is again 1.
Under these information and conditions, when we try to train the data, we make a learning
model which evaluates tyrn and trn as the same type of error. However, it is obvious that they
are not the same type of error and somehow we need to separate them.
It is possible to find a small part from initial data which considers only edit distance infor-
mation between correct and incorrect words in table 3. In this table, we have only 4 columns
which are username, misspelledWord, correctWord, editDistance. Every row in the data indi-
cates one mistake which is typed by a user. Needless to say, a user possibly have more than
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username misspelledWord correctWord editDistance
90s blessid bless id 1
90s madonna Madonna 1
90s shoop shop 1
90s montell mantel 2
morganstreet willdwliver wildlife 4
morganstreet kernal kernel 1
Table 3: A small part of the first version of data
one row in the data since a user generally types lots of misspelled word when we consider
the all tweets of this user. Although, it is possible to understand the meanings of columns by
just looking their names, we need to explain the columns to make it clear. username donates
user id of the user, misspelledWord denotes the word which is typed incorrectly by user, cor-
rectWord denotes the word which is the correct version of the misspelled word (we explained
how we detect correct version of the word above), and editDistance denotes the edit distance
between correct and misspelled word (we also explained how we calculate edit distance in
Section 2.2). When we want to train this data, we evaluate misspelledWord, correctWord,
editDistance columns as attributes while username is a label since we are trying to predict
authors of tweets.
After the results and the observations of the first step, beyond calculating edit distance
between words, we additionally determined error types of incorrect words and used these er-
ror types for learning model. Consider again tyrn and trn words which are typed by different
user. As we have stated before, both two user intended to write turn and both two incorrect
words has 1 as edit distance measure. However, the operation to convert tyrn into turn is
a substitution of y and u. On the other hand, an deletion(u) operation is needed to get trn
from turn. In that situation, we can distinguish users better and it constructs a better learning
model for classification. We again apply this experiment on 100 users where each of users
has at least 180 tweets and the results show that we have a 52 percent of accuracy for exact
prediction of users.
This data which contains more detailed information for errors can be found in Table 4.
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username misspelledWord correctWord editDistance insert delete subs1 subs2
90s blessid bless id 1 empty
90s madonna Madonna 1 M m
90s shoop shop 1 o
90s montell mantel 2 a o
90s montell mantel 2 l
morganstreet willdwliver wildlife 4 l
morganstreet willdwliver wildlife 4 w
morganstreet willdwliver wildlife 4 f v
morganstreet willdwliver wildlife 4 r
morganstreet kernal kernel 1 e a
Table 4: A small part of the second version of data
In this data, apart from username, misspelledWord, correctWord, editDistance columns, there
are four other columns which are insert, delete, subs1, subs2. insert column indicates the nec-
essary character which should be inserted to misspelled word to reach correct word. delete
column similarly indicates the necessary character which should be deleted from misspelled
word. subs1 and subs2 columns denotes that the character in subs2 should be substituted with
the character in subs1 to reach again correct word. Additionally, we need to emphasize that
each row in Table 4 refers to only one misspell operation in a misspelled word. However,
sometimes we need more than one misspell operation to convert an incorrect word into the
correct version. In such a case, there are more than one rows for this misspelled word where
each row indicates a different operation. One can ask that why we did not keep all operations
in one row for a specific word. The reason behind that if we use such a technique, then order
of the mistakes would be important. For example, assume that a specific user u typed a word
incorrectly and this word needs two substitutions which are a−e and m−n respectively. Then
assume that we keep this information in our data as subs1 is a, subs2 is e, subs1’ is m and
subs2’ is n. The problem is that the classifier would except that user u should repeat m − n
substitution error in subs1’ and subs2’ columns to identify this user. However, when user u
types a word which needs m − n as the only substitution or as the first substitution, then m
will be located in subs1 and n will be located in subs2 columns. In that case, classifier may
not be able to identify this user, although m − n substitution error type became as a behavior
of this user u.
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Although this accuracy result does not seem to be evaluated as high success, it can still
be considered to be a privacy leak and we can state two important points which should be
emphasized. Firstly, we have a dramatic improvement when we compare it to the first step of
the experiments. Success rate jumped to 52 percent from 20 percent when we integrate the
specific error types into the learning model for classification. This deduction shows that error
types can be defined as user behaviors that we can distinguish users by just looking their mis-
spelling error types with specific letters, characters and words. Second important point is that
results of the experiments can be improved by analyzing Naive Bayes scores. As it is known,
Naive Bayes is a probabilistic classifier which returns a probability score for each class and
it selects the class which has the highest probability as prediction. In the experiments, when
calculating accuracy score, we look at this predictions and compare it to real class values to
understand whether Naive Bayes predicted correctly. As we stated before, we could manage
to predict 52 percent of users correctly. However, when we look at the incorrect part of the
results, the classifier had a wrong decision for the first prediction but it mostly finds out the
real value in the second or third predictions which are ranked according to the probability
scores. Therefore, if we look for the real values in the first three predictions of classifier,
we managed to get about 72 percent of accuracy. In other words, by using classification of
error types method, we can say that a specific user most probably belongs to a group which
has three user inside it. Additionally, we can extend our definition with k-anonymity at this
point. As we defined k-anonymity in Section 2.9, we may say that we compose a table with
3-anonymity with respect to the set of spell errors. Here, we do not use quasi-identifiers dif-
ferently from original definition, instead we use spell errors.
4.2 Experiments on TF-IDF Based Weighted Cosine Similarity
In this section, we will explain some experiments with their results that supports the claim
we made in the problem definition part. Suppose we have n users {a1, a2, . . . , an} and we do
not have any multiple account information such that one specific user might have one identi-
fiable(public) account a j and one anonymous account ai. We also claim that writing style of
users mostly contains enough information to identify them. In particular, we only analyze the
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words used by users as writing style for the identification process. Although there are some
other information like word pairs, phrases; we do not analyze them.
Since there is no available tweet data on different sets of accounts for the same users, what
we did was to create two sets by using the twitter data that is publicly available as simulated
in Table 5. In order to create two different sets, we took the tweets of a user written in time
and divided them from median into two sets of equal size (i.e., equal number of tweets) in the
first experiment. We took the first part of the tweets to simulate the public accounts (P) and
the second part to simulate the anonymous accounts (A). Then, in the next set of experiments,
we divided tweets of a user into three sets of equal size and again we took the first part of
the tweets to simulate the public accounts (P) and the third part to simulate the anonymous
accounts (A). We did not consider the second part to eliminate the topic bias otherwise we
risk facing the problem of a user talking about specific topics could be easily matched which
would not be fair. In these experiments our aim is to observe topic independent clues for
matching users in public and private accounts.
Public User Anonymous
P1 ← U1 → A1
P2 ← U2 → A2
P3 ← U3 → A3
· ← · → ·
· ← · → ·
· ← · → ·
Pn−1 ← Un−1 → An−1
Pn ← Un → An
Table 5: Composing public and anonymous account from real users
For each account a in P ∪ A, we merge the tweets of a to form a single document. This
way each account is represented by a document formed by merging the tweets under that
account.
In these experiments, we selected some specific users, and then for each user we distribute
all his/her tweets into two different documents (division techniques differentiates in experi-
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ments). In other words, since we have 2 documents (each document contains one half of the
user’s tweets) for each user, we have 2n documents in total for n users. For these documents
we created word vectors with respect to TF-IDF values and then we tried to match these
documents according to Cosine Similarity numerical measure. Thus, our similarity function
s(ai, a j) is based on Cosine Similarity technique. After obtaining the results, we select the
most similar document D′ for each document D and we formulate success rate as number of
correctly selected pairs such that D′ is really the other half of D, over n.
For calculating similarity score between each user, we use RapidMiner tool again. In
Figure 6, the general steps of the process is shown as the main process has five operators
which are Read Excel, Process Documents from Data, Data to Similarity, Similarity to Data
and Write Database. Read Excel operator reads data from an excel file where each row in
the excel represents all tweets of a public or of an anonymous user. The second operator
Process Documents from File is used for creating vectors which contain TF-IDF weights of
documents (rows in excel file) by using absolute prune method. This prune method ignores
some of the words in the documents according to their frequencies. Process Documents from
File operator is a general operator which has some sub-operators inside it like Tokenize and
Transform Cases. Data to Similarity operator calculates similarity measures based on TF-
IDF vectors of the documents. Then, Similarity to Data operator takes the role to produce a
table format like in Table 6. As it can be noticed, every row in this table represents a similar-
ity score between two users. Lastly, Write Database operator transforms this table into our
MYSQL database.
ID1 ID2 sim
ID1 ID3 sim
· · ·
· · ·
· · ·
Table 6: Table Format after Similarity to Data operator
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Figure 6: Cosine Similarity Process in RapidMiner
4.2.1 Experiment for users with high number of tweets and median division of tweets
In this experiments, we sorted users according to the number of tweets they have and we
selected the users with high number of tweets. Additionally, to get a public and an anonymous
account from a user, we divided tweets of the user from median into two equal size.
• When n is 90 or 100, each user has at least 180 tweets.
• When n is 200, each user has at least 162 tweets.
• When n is 500, each user has at least 139tweets.
where n denotes number of user in the experiment.
Assume that a specific user has 120 tweets in total. For this user, we select first 60 tweets
for its public account, and last 60 tweets for anonymous account as shown in Figure 7.
For this experiment, results are given in Figure 8:
As you can notice in the results, each user has very high number of tweets, regarding this
the success rates are very high too. High number of tweets means better information for a
31
Figure 7: Division from median
user and users become more distinguishable. One other possible reason for very high match
is topic dependence. In other words, when we use the median to divide the ordered data set
into two halves (tweets are ordered according to time that they had been posted by user), they
probably mention similar or same topics and finding a relation between two halves of a user
(i.e. between public and anonymous account of a user) is more possible.
4.2.2 Experiment for users with lower number of tweets and median division of tweets
As we have pointed, one of the main reasons that the experiment in Section 4.2.1 leads very
high success rates is that each user has high number of tweets which makes it possible to
have a good model of the users. For this reason, we wanted to test the effect of number of
tweets for the success rate when users have lower number of tweets. In this experiment, we
first selected 100 users where each user has exactly 40 tweets, then we selected another 100
users where each user has exactly 50 tweets, and lastly we selected 100 users where each
user has exactly 60 tweets. Note that we again use the same technique with experiment in
Section 4.2.1 for creating public and anonymous accounts from a user.
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Figure 8: Percentage of correct identification of users for different number of users
When n (number of users) is always 100, the results are as in Figure 9:
Figure 9: Percentage of correct identification of users for different number of users who have
less tweets
As number of tweets per user decreases, the success rate for identification of user also
decreases. The success rate is 70 percent when users have 40 tweets, however when each user
has 50 and 60 tweets, the success rates jumps over 85 and 90 percent respectively. Therefore,
we experimentally show that high number of tweets helps to construct a better model for
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users to distinguish them between each other.
4.2.3 Experiment for different number of users without topic dependency
One other possible reason for very high match in the experiment of Section 4.2.1 is topic
dependency as it is stated before. To eliminate topic dependency, initially we selected n users
who has maximum number of tweets, then we selected first 1/3 part and last 1/3 part of tweets
for each user where tweets are sorted according to the time that they have been posted.
Again assume a specific user who has 120 tweets in total. We select first 40 tweets to-
gether as document of public account and we select last 40 tweets for the anonymous account
as shown in 10.
Figure 10: Division for topic independence
Consequently, we had 2n documents where each document contains 1/3 of tweets of a
user that these tweets can be either the earliest 1/3 part of tweets of a user or the last 1/3
part of tweets of a user as shown in Figure 10. Results of this experiment are presented in
Figure 11.
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Figure 11: Exact match rate for topic independence case
We apply this process on different number of users such that user numbers are 100, 150,
200 and 1000 respectively. When we evaluate this experiment, we try to prevent topic based
bias for tweet matching. Even if we choose tweets of a user from different times, it means
that this user probably mentioning about different topics in his/her tweets but we are still able
to match correct documents of a user with high ratios.
4.2.4 Experiment for identifying users in top k
We claim that we can match an anonymous account ai, where ai∈A, with identifiable(public)
account a j, where a j∈P, of same user in top k with high accuracy where k is not too large
(3,4, . . . ), instead of using exact match (i.e k=1). In this concept, we used a similar prepro-
cessing technique like we used in Section 4.2.3. Again we select the least recent and the most
recent tweets of each user in two different documents to prevent topic biased dependence.
Afterwards, for each document d, we get an ordered list of similar documents according to
scores obtained from the similarity function and we figure out the rank of the real half of the
document d. After we obtain this rank for each user, we take the average of these values to
determine average k. At this point, we say that we can match an anonymous account ai with
an identifiable account a j of the same user averagely in top k.
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For different number of users, the average of the k values for each test given in Figure 12:
Figure 12: Average values of k for the different number of twitter accounts
Figure 12 shows that we can mostly identify anonymous accounts in top k where k is
small as our claim says. We managed to identify 100, 150 and 200 users averagely in top
4, 6 and 8 respectively. However, when number of users is 1000, average value jumps to 52
because of some outliers which have big values. For that reason, we believe that it is useful
to analyze distribution of k for different n values.
When n = 100, the distribution of k is given in Figure 13. 86 users can be identified in top
k where k = 3.
When n = 150, the distribution of k is given in Figure 14. 133 users can be identified in
top k where k = 4.
When n = 200, the distribution of k is given in Figure 15. 163 users can be identified in
top k where k = 3.
When n = 1000, the distribution of k is given in Figure 16. 711 users can be identified in
top k where k = 8.
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Figure 13: Distribution of k when the number of users is 100
Figure 14: Distribution of k when the number of users is 150
Consequently, these figures and experiments show that users can be matched with their
true identity with high accuracy in top-k where k changes depending to number of users in
tests. However, experiments also show that k value is not so large which means that we can
speak of a violation in privacy of individuals.
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Figure 15: Distribution of k when the number of users is 200
Figure 16: Distribution of k when the number of users is 1000
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5 Related Work
In this thesis, we are working on keeping privacy of individuals by also mentioning some
privacy preserving techniques like k-anonymity in Section 2.9. In recent years, privacy pre-
serving data publishing is one of the hot research areas that researchers are interested in. One
reason that points the importance of data publishing is finding a linkage through some pub-
licly available data. Imagine that you have a hospital data which some anonymization process
is applied on this data for keeping sensitive information hidden. However, some adversary
can find some common quasi-identifiers from another publicly available data to identify indi-
viduals or sensitive information as this process is named as record linkage attack. One other
way for revealing sensitive information is Functional Dependencies(FD) attack as Wang and
Liu mention in [38]. They emphasize that existing techniques are not enough to provide pri-
vacy against FD-attacks on published data. A functional dependency is defined in [38] as
follows:
Definition 5.0.1 Given two attributes X and Y, a published data D satisfies the functional
dependency F: X → Y if for every row(tuple) r1, r2 ∈ D, if X attributes of rows(or record)
r1 and r2 are same then Y attributes of r1 and r2 are also same. Here, X is called as deter-
minant attribute while Y is dependent attribute as in [38]. They consider Full Functional
Dependency(FFD) in [38] as FFD is the function F: X → Y that satisfies for all X and Y
values.
FDs can be efficiently used by adversaries to violate the privacy as we said before. Con-
sider the Table 7,8,9 which are represented in [38] to give an example of FD attack. Note
that Sex and Zip attributes are quasi-identifiers(QI) while Phone and Disease are sensitive
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attributes of this table. And also Name attribute is an ID such that it should be kept hid-
den for individuals’ privacy. Assume that there is a functional dependency in Table 7 F:
Phone → Zip, where this FD means that if telephone numbers of two records are same,
then the zip codes of these records are also same.
Name Sex Zip Phone Disease
Alice F 07921 1111111 Ovarian cancer
Bob M 07920 2222222 Bronchitis
Calvin M 07902 3333333 Diabetes
Doris F 07901 1000001 Ovarian cancer
Eve F 07902 3333333 Bronchitis
Flora F 07903 2000001 Pneumonia
Table 7: (a) The original data
When we look at Table 8, it is an anonymized table such that Name attribute is removed
while Sex and Zip attributes generalized for satisfying 3-anonymization. First three records in
this table are indistinguishable between each other with respect to quasi-identifiers(Sex and
Zip) and last three records are also indistinguishable between each other.
Sex Zip Phone Disease
* 079** 1111111 Ovarian cancer
* 079** 2222222 Bronchitis
* 079** 3333333 Diabetes
F 0790* 1000001 Ovarian cancer
F 0790* 3333333 Bronchitis
F 0790* 2000001 Pneumonia
Table 8: (b) The 3-anonymized table
However, if an adversary knows the functional dependency F: Phone → Zip, then he/she
can notice that the telephone numbers of the third and the fifth records are same. Therefore,
their zip codes must also be same according to the FD and zip code of the third record can be
changed as in Table 9. In this case, adversary managed to break 3-anonymization in Table 8
and this situation is a dangerous attack which should be a serious concern. For this problem,
Wang and Liu define a privacy model which is (d, l) − in f erence, they also define some effi-
cient algorithms to anonymization for privacy issues but they also concern about the quality
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of the data that minimum loss of information should be provided while anonymization pro-
cess is being applied.
Sex Zip Phone Disease
* 079** 1111111 Ovarian cancer
* 079** 2222222 Bronchitis
* 0790* 3333333 Diabetes
F 0790* 1000001 Ovarian cancer
F 0790* 3333333 Bronchitis
F 0790* 2000001 Pneumonia
Table 9: (c) Table after FD inference
Machanavajjhala et al. [25] also mentions about publishing data about individuals with
pointing techniques and problems about these techniques. They claim that k-anonymity is not
strong enough to keep privacy of individuals such that an adversary with some background
information can reveal sensitive information of individuals even if the data is protected by
k-anonymization. To prove this claim, they simulate some attacks on k-anonymous dataset
which are homogeneity attack and background knowledge attack by showing their practical
applications for bringing a k-anonymous dataset into disrepute. For all these reasons, l-
diversity privacy technique is introduced in [25, 8] as the following:
Definition 5.0.2 A table T is l-diverse if for each equivalence class E, the probability of
occurrence of all sensitive values is should be at most 1/l.
To give a similar example like in [25, 8], consider the following Table 10. In this ta-
ble Age, City and Sex are quasi-identifiers while Disease is a sensitive attribute. It is easy
to notice that Table 10 is 2-anonymous with respect to quasi-identifiers. However, it is still
doubtful whether privacy is preserved by k-anonymity. Consider a male who is 25 years old
and an adversary wants to learn the disease of this male by assuming our dataset contains
information about mentioned male. If we look for a record where Age is 25 and Sex is M,
then we can reveal that this person has Leukaemia as disease; and ofcourse the adversary can
reveal too.
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Age City Sex Disease
[20-30] Izmir M Leukaemia
[20-30] Izmir M Leukaemia
[30-40] Istanbul F Broken Leg
[30-40] Istanbul F Flu
Table 10: A table with 2-anonymity
On the other hand, when we look at the Table 11, we see that this table is both 2-
anonymous and 2-diverse. Additionally, when we consider about the attack we defined above,
it does not create any thread anymore. Shortly, Machanavajjhala et al. [25] shows deficiency
of k-anonymization due to insufficient diversity of sensitive values in equivalence classes and
they introduce l-diversity which provides more efficient privacy in publishing datasets.
Age City Sex Disease
[20-30] Izmir M Cold
[20-30] Izmir M Leukaemia
[30-40] Istanbul F Broken Leg
[30-40] Istanbul F Flu
Table 11: A table with 2-diversity
As the part of publishing publicly available datasets, data suppression and data swap-
ping(changing) are also some basic concepts that are mentioned in [11, 13, 14, 10, 8]. In
these papers, while the privacy preserving of data is the main goal of their work, but quality
of the data is also one of the indispensable conditions in the research area. For every general-
ization process in k-anonymity or l-diversity to provide privacy of data is loss of information
in the data. In other words, there is a trade of between privacy and quality of data. Consider
a data which contains thousands of records and assume that k-anonymity or l-diversity is not
satisfied just because of a few number of records. In that case, we may prefer to change the
contents of these records in a way that privacy preserving techniques will be satisfied. We
call this operation as data swapping. Or we may prefer to ignore these records by deleting
them and this process is called as data suppression.
42
Zhou and Pei [43] mention a different kind of attack on social work named as Neighbor-
hood Attack for identification of users in a graph. They remind that structure of a social web
can be represented by graphs where nodes denote users and edges denote the friendship be-
tween these users. Their main goal to show that an adversary, who has some knowledge about
individuals, can attack to the graph to identify some of the victims. Similarly, Das et al. [12]
considers a social network as a weighted graph and they apply edge weight anonymization
for the privacy preservation of individuals. Backstorm et al. [4] defines a technique for iden-
tification of vertices in anonymous graphs by using isomorphism and automorphism features
of graphs.
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6 Conclusion and Future Work
In this thesis, we mainly mentioned that some people tend to create anonymous accounts on
Twitter (or another platform on social work). The reason behind this is that they want to
show a reaction towards political and social issues as social web one of the best places where
users are able to reach the most number of people. Additionally, they do not want to come
to light since they do not want to get in trouble. In that sense, we claimed that just creating
another account with some other user name or changing IP etc. are not enough to preserve
their privacy. To prove that claim, we used a real twitter data which is publicly available,
and also we created public and anonymous accounts of same users to check whether we can
identify an anonymous account with its true public account.
For this purpose, we introduced two different techniques to show that anonymous ac-
counts are able to be identified. The first technique is that we created a learning model of
each user through their misspell error information. We kept the information of the words
which users type incorrectly, their correct versions, the edit distance between these correct
and incorrect words, type of the misspells and the specific characters for each mistake. In
the long term, we observe that these errors became as a behavior of users and we can match
an anonymous account with its public account through this learning model by using Naive
Bayes classification algorithm.
As the second technique, for each user, we collected all tweets sequentially of that user as
one document and then for each user again, we created vector of weights where every index
is tf-idf value of a term. When we want to match a specific anonymous account with a public
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account, we used cosine similarity technique which returns a similarity score for each public
account. Then, we rank these public account according to the similarity values and we select
the most similar k public account to match.
Experiments show that both two techniques had high accuracy for matching an anony-
mous account with a public account in top k where k is small. Even for the exact matching
(for k = 1), we succeeded to reach good accuracy and we obviously had much better results
for the different values of k (values for bigger than 1).
For future work part, we suggested two different solutions in Section 3.3 which should
be applied and tested. For the misspell identification technique, we suggested to refine mis-
spell words with their correct versions. On the other hand, for the cosine similarity document
matching technique, we advised to replace the words, of which tf-idf values are high, with
their synonyms. A tool may be implemented to apply these solutions and the results should
be tested with some number of experiments.
One other thing which can be tested in the following works is that considering the specific
time intervals of tweet for matching process. In other words, when an anonymous user is
desired to be identified, then some tweets of anonymous and public users in a specific time
interval may be used. In that case, because of the probability that anonymous and public
users may talk about similar topics, some interesting results can be obtained to compare with
the current results.
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